commit 5463246a3037c586d4dfdc7ae94ab72dd7327c4a
parent 3d7fb7bb08e9801c55e744822c52109434870e4a
Author: Ryan Wolf <rwolf@borderstylo.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2010 03:12:30 -0800
more typos
Diffstat:
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ Rock 'Em Sock 'Em Rational Agents
During my first Game Theory class, I read an article about [fictitious play](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fictitious_play), a demonstration of how two rational agents might converge on Nash equilibrium in [normal-form games](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normal-form_game) by following a simple strategy:
-* Given the frequency with which your opponent has chosen the first option, determine the liklihood that they will choose it for this game. If your opponent has not played this game with your before, set the liklihood to 50%.
+* Given the frequency with which your opponent has chosen the first option, determine the liklihood that they will choose it for this game. If your opponent has not played this game with you before, set the liklihood to 50%.
* Given the liklihood your opponent will choose the first option and the payoff matrix, determine the expected value of both of your options.
-* Given the expected value of both of your options, choose the option with the highest expected value. If both options have the same expected value, choose randomly.
+* Choose the option with the highest expected value. If both options have the same expected value, choose randomly.
The idea is that two agents following this strategy and playing the same game over and over will mimic the behavior of rational agents who found the Nash equlibria of a given game and chose an appropriate mixed strategy.
